Regulation
and Deregulation of the Internet
Columbia University
Paper for the
Conference “Internet & Politics”
Academy to the Third
Millennium
Munich, February 1997
Why
the Internet will be regulated
A myth is going around that has almost
been elevated to the status of platitude: “you cannot regulate the
Internet.” There is a related myth,
that “a bit is a bit,” that no bit can therefore be treated differently from
any other, and that attempts at control
are therefore doomed to fail. Both
claims, though originating with
technologists who implicitly seem to
believe in technological determinism,
are wrong even as a matter of technology: a bit is a bit with a certain
probability, which can be made to vary. A bit is a bit with a certain priority,
which can be made to vary. In most computer communication, a bit does not
travel naked but in an envelope, a packet.
A packet is identified by its destination and sender. And once one can differentiate, one can
control.
Also, communication is not just a
matter of signals but of people and
institutions. For all the appeal of the
notion of “virtuality,” one should not forget that physical reality is alive
and well. Senders, recipients, and
intermediaries are living, breathing people, or they are legally organized
institutions with physical domiciles and physical hardware. The arm of the law
can reach them. It may be possible to
evade such law, but the same is true when it comes to tax regulations. Just because a law cannot fully stop an
activity does not prove that such law is ineffective or undesirable.
This, most emphatically, does not
mean that we should regulate
cyberspace (whatever it is). But that is a normative question of values, not
one of technological determinism. We
should choose freedom because we want to,
not because we have to. And that
choice will not be materially different from those which societies generally
apply. As the Internet moves from a nerd-preserve to an office park, shopping
mall, and community center, it is sheer fantasy to expect that its uses and
users will be beyond the law. This
seems obvious. Yet, for many, the new
medium is like a Rorschach test, an
electronic blob into which they project
their own fantasies, desires and fears for society. As the Russians say: Same bed, different dreams. Traditionalists
find the dark forces of degeneracy, as in everything. Libertarians find an atrophy of government. Leftists find a new community, devoid
of the material avarice of private
business. This kind of dreaming is
common for new and fundamental technology, and it is usually wrong.
For better or worse, each society
will apply its own accumulated wisdom, prejudices, self-interests and
misconceptions to the rules governing cyberspace. For better or worse, new
situations lead to more rules, not less. More, because there will also be an
entirely new layer of rules, those of the various electronically defined
communities that are indeed now forming. Rules on who can do what, when, and
how, or else -- “or else” meaning to
lose your access code and be electronically banished. More rules, because new situations will emerge. Just consider what will happen when the
cooperative spirit of the Internet is broken by software programs deliberately
set to lie, cheat, and harm others.
The techniques for control vary
depending on the target. Transmission
backbones can be set and controlled.
Interconnection and traffic hand-off points can be regulated. ISPs can be held liable for content, and
they could be licensed. Hardware can be
required to have a screening chip.
Content providers can have their servers traced and licensed. Organizations can be held liable for content
on their computers, available to employees.
Routing tables can be
controlled. Taxes and tariffs can be
levied. Anonymous remailers could be
outlawed.
China is building an Internet
backbone that is only connected to the worldwide one through set control
points. Arab nations are not allowing
their citizens full Internet access and are censoring the WWW and other
areas. Singapore, long a country that
strongly supports social order, has also imposed restrictions on Internet
access, through laws against “improper” usage of the net and government control
over all ISPs.
Societal
Risk Taking in the US
A society’s choice of rules will
depend, among other things, on its willingness to accept risk. The Internet is new and uncharted
territory. The term “electronic
frontier” is quite apt. As it happens, America has been in the frontier
business for a long time. It’s good at it. It’s its defining characteristic,
together with liberty and free enterprise. No wonder then that America is at
the leading edge of the information age.
Certainly, the US has seen risk
taking by investors and entrepreneurs.
But one must also take note of the societal risk taking in the
information field. The decision to
split up AT&T, the world’s largest company, was a major risk. The decision
to open telecommunications to competition was a major risk, flying into the
face of conventional wisdom of “natural
monopoly” and the need for a monopoly
to preserve universal service financing.
Europeans, not so long ago, were
almost united in their support of the state monopoly system. Today, of course,
it is hard to find anybody who admits to ever having held that view. The decision by the National Science
Foundation to fund the Internet was a risk.
The decision to introduce local telecommunications competition, together
with recent fairly radical rules on interconnection and network unbundling, is
a risk. And it is risky to proclaim a
national commitment to wire up all school rooms in the country, and to follow
it up with a funding scheme that is, in effect, a telephone tax.
The term “risk-taking” seems more appropriate
than “deregulation.” First, because the
US system has not been truly deregulatory: there are more rules than ever. One of them gives Internet Service Providers
preferential access to the local phone networks. Second, because part of the process involved government as a
venture capitalist of sorts, fronting the money for the Internet. Of course, Europeans also support high tech
ventures. But the money funds to go to
tried-and-true defense contractors and PTT supporters. Third, because the US is instituting a new
entitlement program ($2.25 billion for educational Internet access) that will
grow in size over time.
These are risks for several reasons:
first, because the policies could go wrong. There was no real precedent, after
all, at the time. It is much easier now
to be the eighteenth country to liberalize its telecommunications, and to do so
in harmony with one’s regional neighbors.
Second, because the politics could
have gone wrong. Liberalization was unpopular with the public. It was
especially unpopular with the major economic stake-holders. Twenty years ago, the American
communications industry was dominated by a handful of firms: AT&T owned
telecommunications; IBM controlled computers; and ABC, CBS, and NBC ran
television. In most cases, the new
policies went against the interests of the dominant firms and in favor of
“unborn generations” of technology that
had no political clout. This is not supposed to happen in an interest-group
driven democracy.
Third and relatedly, the policies are
risky because the changes they initiate will fundamentally transform most
established institutions in society.
Governments are rarely in the business of initiating revolutions. They are usually firmly on the other side.
Losers
of the Information Age
So where is this risk-taking taking
American society? It would be naive to
expect the changes to be merely those of added personal convenience. The
horse-less carriage changed much more than the cleanliness of streets. It
transformed the way we live work, and interact. The wireless telegraph
eventually became television and changed politics, entertainment, and
education.
The
underlying force is a simple but basic principle: every time one makes a communications flow
relatively more convenient, powerful, and cheap, one also makes a traditional
communications flow relatively less convenient, less powerful, and more
expensive. If one develops new routes
of communication, old ones atrophy.
When Columbus and Vasco de Gama opened up new trade routes, Venice
became a museum. When highways were
built, cities emptied. When airplanes
speeded up intercontinental travel, sports teams could relocate, and Brooklyn
lost the Dodgers.
Electronic communications are no
different. Let us look at two examples
of how two types of traditional institutions will be affected; one is
commercial, the other, non-profit.
1)
The Decline of Banks
Bill Gates described banks as
dinosaurs. Banks are not strictly about
money but about information. In
fulfilling their functions, banks, like all institutions, are based on a
particular set of information technology and economics. If the technology and the economics change,
the institutions must adjust, too.
Take
automatic teller machines.
ATMs were introduced by banks to
cut costs. More than 10,000 bank
branches were closed. Today, most
American ATMs are not located at banks anymore. Like God, ATMs are now
everywhere except at banks. Customers
deal with machines interlinked by networks and care little about who is
behind the machine -- a bank, a near-bank, a distant bank or a non-bank. Over 13,000 ATMs are already operated by
non-banks. And this is just the
beginning. When ATMs migrate to PCs and
one can download and upload cybercash onto smartcards, banks will lose much of
their traditional locational advantage.
Quite possibly, they will give way to vast electronic financial shopping
malls owned by investors from Bahrain and managed out of Singapore.
Even
more radical will be the change in the nature of money. Technology will
lead to new types of money -- e-money, digital cash, cyber-dollars. This
creates “open money,” stateless currencies that compete with each other, that
may be accepted around the globe, but are responsible to no one. Money that pays interest; or money that is
restricted to certain uses. Governments
will lose control over the money supply
and monetary policy. This is doubly
ironic, because it coincides with efforts in Europe to create an elaborate
official super-currency--- just when the whole concept of an state-controlled
currency beginning its transformation into competitive private monies.
2)
The Decline of Universities
The second example is higher
education. It is generally believed
that universities will benefit from the new tools of communication. But the opposite is more likely.
Most branches
of science show an exponential growth of about 4‑8 percent annually, with
a doubling period of 10‑15 years.
The resultant inexorable specialization of scholars means that universities cannot
maintain a coverage of all subject areas in the face of the expanding universe
of knowledge, unless their research staff grows more or less at the same rate
as scholarly output, doubling every 5-10 years. This is neither sustainable
economically nor organizationally, and leads to specialization. Specialized scholars therefore find fewer
similarly specialized colleagues on their own campus for purposes of
complementarily of work. Instead, interaction increasingly takes place in
electronic communities with distant specialists i.e. in the professional rather
than the physical realm.
And on the teaching function of the
university it is hard to imagine that the present low-tech, high-cost system
will survive. If alternative instructional technologies and
credentialing system can be devised, there will be an out-migration from
classic campus-based higher education. The point is
not that electronic instruction is superior to face-to face teaching. It is not--though the latter is often
romanticized. Rather, it can be
provided at dramatically lower cost.
We may well
have in the future a "McGraw-Hill University" giving out degrees or
certificates. If these programs are
valued by employers and society for their quality of admitted students, the
knowledge they gain, and the requirements that they must pass, they will be
able to compete with traditional universities, yet without bearing the
substantial overhead of physical institutions.
The question is not whether
universities are important to society, to knowledge, or to their members --
they are -- but rather whether the economic foundation of the present system
can be maintained and sustained in the face of the changed flow of information
due to electronic communications. It is
not research and teaching that will be under pressure -- they will be more
important than ever -- but rather their present main instructional setting, the
university system. To be culturally
important is necessary (one hopes) but unfortunately not sufficient.
The
Counter-Revolution
What is the point? Similar changes will affect every single one
of society’s institutions, just as the industrial revolution changed every one
of the feudal structures. But for
every revolution there is a counter-revolution. And just as the industrial revolution of the Nineteenth Century
led to the romantic movement as a reaction, so does the information age lead to
a neo-romantic longing for the lost golden age. This reaction is now marshaling
forces in America. The risk-takers are
being challenged by those who want to prop up every institution.
Today, a Cassandra industry is in
full force in America, and an avalanche of anti-technology and neo‑luddite
literature is rolling in. Today's fears are the usual suspects in new garb:
Impressionable children. Sex. Violence. Crime. Alienation. Extremist potential.
Isolation. Information poverty. Trade Deficits. Cultural Deficits.
Where once lowest common denominator
programming was decried for TV, we now
mourn the loss of the national dialogue and of the common hearth. Where
once youngsters were said not to communicate enough with each other and the
world, they now are said to communicate excessively, obsessively, and sloppily.
In the US, resistance has begun to gather. The leading edge, as always, is the
protection of children. The Computer
Decency Act was adapted as part of 1996 Telecommunications Reform Act. There are similar laws in several states. Such laws will lose in court because US has
a very strong free speech protection in its Constitution. But for other of conduct, and transactions
where less Constitutional protections exist, the restrictions will be more
enduring.
Suppose that no CDA had been
passed. What would happen? Would we
experience a rampant use by children of pornography, beyond traditional
adolescent rites? Not really. Parentally controlled software agents can
act as electronic censors. Filtering
agents would maintain a list of obscene web sites, and blocks them. Others would block based on ratings ratings
embedded in the web page. Backup
recommendations would be offered or sold by organizations such as the TV Guide;
the Baptist Christian parents
association, or the anarchist league.
In other words, the problem could have largely been solved by
itself. But the political system, in an
election year, could not let things just happen.
Contrasting
Perspectives on Reaching the Information Age.
The American political system has
been most effective where it risks in the emergence of order without
direction. This is a very optimistic
concept. It believes that problems resolve themselves by action and
transaction. This is not a
specifically American idea. The French
physiocrats and the Scottish enlightenment were there first.
Adam Smith and John Locke believed in
spontaneous order arising in decentralized fashion. This is truly a powerful
idea, and one with which continental Europeans have by and large been
uncomfortable. An example are different
approach to computers.
Take France, in particular. How did
France approach computer communications? Energetically, centrally, and
unsuccessfully.
First, it commissioned a beautiful
official study, the Nora-Minc report, still the most literate report about the
information economy, even 20 years later.
With the study identifying the strategic-geopolitical need to fight IBM,
which was in all seriousness compared to past global powers such as the Roman
Catholic Church and the Communist
International (just at the time that Steve Jobs and Bill Gates began their
assaults), the French government proceeded in a well-planned fashion. It poured
money into computer hardware development and owned and micro-managed the
computer industry structure. Such approach had worked magnificently for French
railroads, but it failed for computer technology. There is no French presence in micro-computers, the heart of the
information revolution. What industry
is largely becoming (outside the defense sector) is subcontractors in return
for market access. Second, the
government created the Minitel system,
controlled and financed by the state monopoly France Telecom. It even gave away the terminals for
free. All state organizations
contributed content. As a result,
France became the undisputed world leader in videotex. The problem was only
that videotex was leapfrogged by the hardware and software that flowed, in a
largely unplanned way, from a bunch of upstart American and European
institutions, with much sharing, giving away, and stealing. Total chaos. How can one expect a phone
company to manage such a process?
Today, the Minitel is a technologically backward system, slow and crude,
held aloft by subsidies and its usefulness in billing for transactions. As soon as the Internet overcomes the
billing hurdle, Minitel will slide into secondary status. Today, Internet penetration is low, ISPs are
unfavored and public debate centers on the absence of French on the web.
The same philosophy of order, only
more so, is evident in Far Eastern countries such as Singapore. That country
values harmony. It does not trust the
interaction of individuals to generate order within dynamism. The Internet must be controlled, just as
elections are. Singapore’s restrictive
rules will prove that Internet
regulation is possible as a technical and legal proposition. Whether it is good business or good social
policy is another matter.
Divergent
Approaches to Privacy
A similar divergence of the US and
European approach exists in many other
areas of the infrastructure revolution. Let us look at privacy in the electronic
sphere.
Privacy is important, and information
technology keeps raising new threats.
In the past, if remedies were considered, the primary strategy has been
to manage risk by regulation. Within
that position there were two major directions -- centralized general protection
and decentralized ad-hoc protection.
West European countries, in particular, pursued the former and passed
comprehensive (omnibus) data protection laws and established institutionalized boards
with fairly rigorous rules, and coordinated internationally on information
collection and data flows. The United
States, in contrast, dealt with specific problems as they emerged, and with
different approaches across the country. This led to a less systematic approach than in Europe.
The practice for the state to control
and protect privacy is a natural response in the telecommunications field,
given its history as a state-controlled monopoly. It led to a view of privacy problems largely as an issue of
rights, and the question is how to create such rights in the political,
regulatory and legal sphere. Such a
view is appropriate in the context of privacy rights of the individual against
the state. But the same cannot be said
for the privacy claims of individuals against other individuals. The allocation of rights is only the
beginning of a much more complex interaction.
Some people may want and need more privacy than others. Privacy, by definition, is an interaction in
which the informational rights of different parties collide. This would suggest that interactive
negotiation over privacy would have a place in establishing and protecting
privacy.
Take the example of intrusion into
privacy by telemarketing calls. Both of
the parties to a telephone solicitation call attribute a certain utility to
their preference to call or to be left alone.
Because privacy and access are of value to parties in a telemarketing
transaction, exchange transactions will emerge if they become technically
feasible. On a practical level, one
could envision a Personal-900 Service, in
which the calling party pays a fee to the called party. The caller would be automatically informed
that the customer charges telemarketers for his time and attention.
Individual customers could set
different price schedules for themselves based on their privacy value, time
constraints, and even the time of day.
They would establish a "personal access charge" account with
their phone or an enhanced services provider, or a credit card company. By
proceeding, the telemarketer enters into a contractual agreement. The billing service provider would then
automatically credit and debit the accounts in question.
Of course, efficiency is not the only
value to be concerned about. But one
must recognize that right is merely an
initial allocation, and it is in the nature of humans to have varying
preferences and needs, and to exchange what they have for what they want. In doing so they exercise another
fundamental right, the right of free choice.
It is a fallacy is to believe that
the market approach to privacy protection is overly generous to business
violators of personal privacy. On the contrary, the tools of access control
will shift the balance of power to
individuals and to the protection of privacy. Indeed, it will be the business
users of personal information who will end up objecting to transactions. But what can they do about it? Right now, individuals do not yet have
effective means to make those desiring personal information compensate
them. But the tools to change this,
such as encryption or caller identification, are here or near.
The
Long Term
So where is all this taking us?
It is a common fallacy to
over-estimate the short term but to under-estimate the long term. Thus, we over-estimate the short-term
ability of electronic communications to be free of government controls, because
it is believed that “you can’t regulate the Internet.” But the long-term is another matter. The long-term leads to entirely new concepts
of political community. Just as
traditional banks and traditional universities will decline, so will
traditional forms of jurisdiction. A
few years ago, it became fashionable to speak of communications creating the
"global village."-- communal and peaceful. But there is nothing
village-like in the unfolding reality. Instead, groups with shared economic
interests are extending national group pluralism through the opportunity to
create global interconnection with each other into the international
sphere. The new group networks do not
create a global village, they create instead the world as a series of
electronic neighborhoods.
In time,
they are likely to become quasi-jurisdictions.
They have to mediate the conflicting interests of their members. They have to establish cost shares,
sometimes creating their own de-facto taxing mechanism as well as
redistribution. They have to determine
major investments, to set standards, to decide whom to admit and whom to
expel. Control over management becomes
fought over. Elections may take place. Constitutions, bylaws and regulations
are passed. Arbitration mechanisms are set up. Financial assessment of members
takes place.
Thus, we may
today worry about the nature of Internet regulation in America, as in Europe,
as in the asymmetry among them. But in
the future, the most interesting questions will be the nature, the dynamics,
the law, and the politics of the new types of communities, and the type of
regulation that comes with self-selected communities.
Communications
define communities, and communities define politics. Thus, the breakdown of the coherent national communications
system reflects and accelerates a fundamental centrifugalism that will reshape,
in time, countries and societies. We
are barely at the beginning of this evolution, and the forces of resistance are
only beginning to fathom the impacts.