The Economics of
the Commons: Organizing Private
Transactions in Communications
Uris Hall, Room 141
[ Agenda and Presentations ]
Registration Please register
online at http://www.ersvp.com/reply/event12319. Regular attendees: $50. Academic,
government, and non-profit rate: $20. Students
may attend for free without lunch,
or for $20 with lunch. CITI
Affiliates: please contact Ben
Bloom at 212-854-4222 for special registration arrangements
Good institutions and governance create incentives to achieve
efficiency, while their neglect can result in a “tragedy of the
commons.”
Although “commons” have been mostly associated with publicly-held
properties,
the notion applies to all exchange regimes. The rules, standards, and
governance that enable commerce are public goods that benefit all
participants.
For example, music copyrights are a commons that have been disrupted by
several
innovations: the record, the radio, and, today, peer-to-peer.
Viewing exchanges as commons can improve regulation and business
strategy, and
can guide entrepreneurs in promoting new markets. Regulators grappling
with the
allocation of radio spectrum are setting rules for a new commons owned
by many
different users. "Massive coordination" in supply chains (e.g. the
flat-panel display industry) creates a commons owned by the associated
firms.
For coordination to succeed, the rules and norms of this commons must
encourage
cooperative behavior. Likewise, a new market like online music creates
a
commons jointly owned by consumers, hosting firms, record companies,
and
musicians.
This conference discusses the commons framework as a generalizable
approach. The presentations will consider several current commons
arrangements.
The emphasis is on the similar features of these cases and how
participants in
each market can learn from the others.